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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION P A·CIFIC RAIL.ROAD CO., 
A corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
STRUCTURAL STEEL & FORGE 
CO., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8785 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Railroad commenced these actions in the Dis-
trict ·Court of the Third Judicial District against appel-
lant for money allegedly due under contracts of rail 
carriage. Appellant is engaged in the business of fabri-
cating structural iron and steel. The dispute involves 
construction of a ''fabrication in transit'' tariff filed 
by the Railroad (Union Pacific Tariff 7188-P). 
This tariff, as all plaintiff's tariffs, was originally 
drafted by the Tariff Bureau of the Union Pacific. Sub-
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sequent revisions of a tariff are shown by a letter after 
the original tariff. The letter '' P'' in this tariff number 
shows that it is at least the sixteenth revision of this 
particular tariff. After being drafted by a Railroad a 
tariff is filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
which reviews it only to see if it has complied with 
certain technical requirements as to form. If no objec-
tions are made by shippers within thirty days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, the tariff becomes 
effective. No objecions were made to the particular tariff. 
The fabrication in transit tariff gives fabricating 
industries located at specified stations along the lTnion 
Pacific which receive, fabricate and then reship steel 
and iron products the lower through-rate (plus nominal 
handling costs) from the original point of departure 
of the unfabricated materials to their ultimate destina-
tion, rather than charging the fabricator the two more 
expensive short-haul rates into and out of the fabricating 
point. One of the results of such a tariff is to place 
Intermountain manufacturers in a mote competitive situ-
ation with relation to manufacturers located either where 
steel originates or "~here the final shipment terminates. 
This tariff is not ".,.hat 1nay be called a rate tariff 
(i.e., one establishing rates and charges for the transpor-
tation of particular classes of conuuodities). The tariff 
jn dispute 1nerely atte1npts to define the factual situ-
utions \vhich n1ust apply and the procedures \Yhieh must 
b<:: followed before a shipper \viii be entitled to the lower 
through-rate \rhieh rate is established for the various 
articles shipped by separate through-rate tariffs) as 
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opposed to the higher charges resulting from separate 
short-haul rates from origin to transit point and from 
transit point to final destination. The Railroad con-
tends that the facts surrounding each of the shipments 
in question do not meet the conditions of the fabrication-
in-transit tariff. The defendant shipper contends they 
do. The shipper does not~..Qontend_he.rg that the rates 
(either thJ_g-q_gh-r~t~t._or ---~hoxt:·ha:ul) are J:tp._reasonable_ 
nor that.inuL:w..per ___ ~l~§~ifiQatiqn of p~rtiQlJJ~!'-. articles 
in the various ship_me11 ts. . has~.I~~uJJe.<;t jg . .th~ shipper 
improperly b~ing charged J9o high a __ raJ~!__ The sole dis-
pute is as to the application of Tariff 7188-P ~o par-
ticular operations of the defendant. For example; there 
is a dispute as to construction of the words "fabricate" 
and ''rework,'' the Railroad contending that certain pro-
cedures followed by defendant do not qualify as "fabri-
cation'' or ''reworking'' within the meaning of the tariff. 
If the tariffis construed as allowing the procedures fol-
lowed by defendant with regard to the particular ship-
ments in questiqn, the defendant is entitled to the 
through-rate and the Railroad's claims are invalid. 
The record does not show whether the Railroad 
ex parte sought the assistance of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission before bringing these actions; it does 
show that the actions had been at is-sue for more than 
a year when the plaintiff Railroad petitioned the Dis-
trict Court ''for continuance and referral to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission", alleging that the doctrine 
of ''primary jurisdiction'' enunciated in U nvted States 
v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 77 Sup. Ct. 161, 
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1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956), was applicable to this, case (~. 
P. 37-38). The petition asked that the court hold in 
abeyance the trial until five specific questions set forth 
in plaintiff's petition involving the construction of 
Tariff 7188-P ''had been submitted to and detennined 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission". The petition 
further asked the court to order plaintiff to institute 
a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Com-
lnission but to retain jurisdiction "for all purposes". 
On November 13, 1957, the Honorable Merrill C. 
Faux executed an order that the five questions· set 
forth in the Railroad's petition be submitted to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission ''for answer and determin-
ation by that body". The order further provided: 
'~IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 
above numbered causes be held in abeyance, and 
they are hereby continued to permit a determina-
tion by the Interstate Commerce Commission of 
the issues of fact involved herein. 
"IT IS FURTHER OR.JDERED that the 
Commission n1ake such further report and de-
ternlination on the issues of tariff interpretation 
and issues of fact as it n1aY deem necessary or 
advisable for the further inf~rmation of the court. 
'·IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said 
proceedings be instituted before the Interstate 
Conunerce Conn11ission 'Yithin thirty days from 
the date of this order. 
'~IT IS FUR-THER ORDERED that a ceri-
fied eo py of this order be filed in the proceedings 
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"The court here by retains jurisdiction of said 
causes for all purposes." 
Defendant then petitioned fo,r an intermediate ap-
peal of this order of referral, .and on April 22, 1958 
this court granted the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
tS 
THE RAILROAD m USING THE UTAH COURTS AS 
A DEVICE TO GAIN AOCESS TO A BODY OTHERWISE 
INACCESSIBLE TO IT. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER THE 
TRIAL COURT IS ASKING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
COMMISSION TO DECIDE THE CASE OR GIVE ADVICE. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOES 
NOT ARISE AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
(a) The history of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
(b) Analysis of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction shows 
it does not arise in the instant case. 
(c) Even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did ari·se, 
it is not applicable in this case. 
POINT IV. 
THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE COURTS OF 
THIS STATE WISH TO ABDICATE VOLUNTARILY SOME 
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THE RAILROAD ~ USING THE UTAH COURTS AS 
A DEVI·CE TO GAIN AGCESS TO A BODY OTHERWISE 
INACCESSIBLE TO IT. 
This is an action for breach of contract of carriage 
brought by a carrier against a shipper. The Railroad 
could have brought this action in either of two forums-
either the United States District Court, Berstein Bros. 
Pipe & Machtne Co. v. Denver & R. G. RR. ·Co., 193 F. 
2d 441 (lOth Cir. 1951), or the Utah District Court. 
One thing is certain: the Railroad could not have tnvtir 
ated thi~s action before the Interstate Commerce Com-
m~ssion. 
The Interstate ·Commerce Act give_~ sl~i.P-J2§rs_~ertain 
rights to make complaint to the CQPJJ1l~§_SiQn against 
a. Q~rJie:r __ (i9 U.S.C.A~_SeQ.~~ and Sec. ~_al.h11J the carrier 
is givep._p_o :right under thatl!~.:t1lGQWJ:ll~_QGe any action ... 
~ainst a shjp_Q_~_:r _Q~f()re the Interstate _QQpUJlerce Coin-
miSSIOn. 
But in this case the Railroad seeks to have its claim 
determined by the Interstate Commerce Co1nmission, a 
right not given it by the Interstate Commerce Act. It 
seeks to do this, str.angely enough, by conm1encing its 
action in the state court and by invoking the doctrine of 
''primary jurisdiction.'' By this 'vonderous phrase, a 
plaintiff seeks to switch foru1ns in midstream, and by 
bringing suit in one forum, to end up in the very forum 
that it could never have reached if it had tried to reach 
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it directly. The Railro.ad, a modern Perseus, cannot reach 
the Gorgon's head by looking directly at it, but by using 
the state court as a mirror, seek to attain its goal. 
This case is unique. To appellant's knowledge there 
are no cases extant ruling on the questions posed here. 
It is ,also a significant case, as it deals with the con-
struction of a tariff which has a direct bearing on the 
co~petitive situation of all Intermountain fabricators. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER THE 
TRIAL COURT IS ASKING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
COMMISSION TO DE~CIDE THE CASE OR GIVE ADVICE. 
Appellant has not been able, ,and is yet unable, to 
ascertain the role in which the ins.tant Order casts the 
Inters.tate Commerce ·Commission. Are its determina-
tions, which under the Order are unlimited in nature or 
scope, to bind the court~, QL._~r~_ th~y- only ~Q,yisory, .to,. 
b~. accepteq. or __ :r;ejeGt~q. in the _di_~yr~ti.O.:r:t~- of .th~_court ~, 
or both~ The record a~d_Qrde.ryyill _SlJpport eitl!gr __ fh_~_<;>ry. 
The ,appellant is unable to resolve the ambiguity. 
The petition by which appellee asked for the order 
cited the Western Pac~fvc case, supra. It stated that the 
aetion "presents a situation analogous to that dealt 
with in Western Pacific'' (r.p. 37). Western Pac~fiJc, 
as will be noted hereafter, is a ''primary jurisdiction'' 
decision. The petition further asked that certain ques-
tions be submitted ''by appropriate administrative pro-
eedure to the Interstate Commerce Commission for de-
termination (r.p. 38, emphasis supplied). The cited ver-
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b.age leads appellant to believe that the Commission's 
findings are to be determinative. This belief is reinforced 
by the O.rder 's language: that five specified questions 
''be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
for answer and determination by that body" (r.p. 42). 
Other language, however, clouds the issue. The peti-
tion recites that the reference is ''to assist this court in 
the determination of the issues" (r.p. 38). The Memor-
andum DeciE;on states that, "Primary jurisdiction of that 
cause is in the Utah District Court" (r.p. 40), and the 
order requires that the Commisson's report extend to 
"tariff interpretation" (r.p. 43), a subject matter, as will 
be seen, that is clearly for the courts. Taken alone, the 
quoted portions would lead appellant to believe that the 
Commission is to act as "a sort of master". 
The mischief of th£l__Qrder is apparent. Appellee 'vill , , 
be able to argue to the trial court that any finding of 
th~ i]Qm.m.!ssion favorable to app~lle~ is conclusive. ~f·~- . 
ho}Ve_v~r, ~Jl.Y answ~~ri~--!!~~~vor_~bl~, .appell~e. will ~rgue 
th~t it is Jil~rely ~<tYi.~9ry. 
Certainly the Railroad should 1nake clear "\Yhich posi-
tion it is taking. However, it is appellant's contention 
that neither reason would justify referral in this case. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOES 
NOT ARISE AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
(a) The history of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
To understand completely the issue here, it is first 
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necessary to review the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
upon which the Railroad relies. 
This doctrine is .a common law development of the 
United States Federal Court system. In state courts little 
mention is made of it. Some states, in meeting similar 
problems, have reached similar results, while othe.r state 
courts have expressly repudiated the doctrine. 42 A.M. 
JUR., Public Admin~strative Law, § 254, at 701. See this 
brief, infra, pp. 2±-32. 
''The fountainhead from which the entire primary 
jurisdiction doctrine flows is Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. 
Ab~lene Cotton O~l Co.," 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 
L. Ed. 553 (1907) DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 665 
(1951). That case was one where a shipper, without resort-
ing to the Interstate Commerce Commission, attempted to 
recover damages in a Texas state court from the Rail-
road for allegedly excessive charges for the transporta-
tion of freight. The shipper based his action on' Section 
9 and Section 22 of the Act. Section 9 provided in part: 
''That any person or persons claiming to be 
damaged by ,any common carrier subject to -the 
provisions of this act may either make complaint 
to the ·Commission as hereinafteT provided for, 
or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for 
the recovery of the damages for which such com-
mon carrier may be liable under the provisions 
of this .act, in any district or circuit court of 
the -united States of competent jurisdiction; but 
such person or persons shall not have the right 
to pursue both of said remedies, and must in 
each case elect which one of the two methods of 
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procedure herein provided for he or they will 
adopt ... " 
Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 9, 24 STAT. 
382 (1887) 
Section 22 expressly stated that: 
''Nothing in this act contained shall in any 
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing 
.at common law or by statute, but the provisions of 
this act are in addition to such remedies . . . '' 
Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 22, 24 STAT. 
387 (1887) 
The shipper relied on what was, from the legislative 
history of the Act, the unequivocal legislative intention 
that the courts should have original jurisdiction of some 
matters th.at might also be within the Commission's pro-
vince. See Convisser, Primary Jurisd~ction: The Rule 
and Its RationalizatiDns, 65 YALE L. J. 315 at 317-328 
(195'6). 
The trial court, while finding the rate in question 
unreasonable and excessive, nevertheless held that since 
the rate had been filed with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission it was. the rate ''established under the Inter-
state Commerce law" and gave judgment to the Rai1 
road. The Texas Court of Civil .... ~ppeals reversed, 
Abi.Zene Cotton Oi~l Co. v. Te:ras & Pac. R. Co., 38 Tex. 
Civ. App. 366, 85 S. W. 1052 (1905). The Texas Appellate 
Court stated the issue as ''whether in a state court a 
shipper in cases of interstate carriage can, by the prin-
ciples of the common la,v, be accorded relief from unjust 
and unreasonable freight rates extracted from him, or 
10 
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shall relief in such cases be denied merely because such 
unreasonable rate has been filed and promulgated by 
the carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act~", Id. at 
368, 85 S.W. at 1053. The court found the .answer in 
the common law right of action which it ruled had been 
preserved by the Act. 
Mr. Justice White, speaking for a unanimous United 
St:ates Supreme Court, reversed, holding that under what 
is now known as the Interstate Commerce Act a shipper 
seeking reparations from .a railroad for excessive freight 
charges must ''primarily invoke redress through the 
Interstate 'Commerce Commission." Texas & Pac. R. Co . 
. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra at 448. 
The decision has not been without strong criticism. 
Davis terms it ''one of the gy_tst~::!n.ding examples in JM1 
Supreme Court ]listory of ~'interpret.aiLo.n~-w~h leads_ 
to a result diamet;rically ()pposed !9. __ ,c!~-~r. ~!l~t~E.?ambig­
uous st3Jtutqry: l~nguage,'' DAVIS supra 665. Another 
.analyst has stated, ''It did violence to the plain statutory 
language and purpose, ignored the legislative history 
and rested upon reasoning mainly notable for its com-
fortable insulation from re~ality. '' Convisser, supra ·at 
316. 
The doctrine has been applied by Federal courts 
from time to time since then, both in dealing with the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and with the N a.tional 
Labor Relations Board and most recently in the field 
·of Fedeval anti-trust litigation; see, for example, von 
'Mehren, The Anti-trust Laws and Regulated Industries; 
11 
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The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,. 67 HARV. L. 
REV. 929 (1954). 
The early rationale for such decisions was hased 
upon the purported desire for uniformity, but later the 
reason given for invocation of the doctrine was the exper-
tise of the administrative board in question. Nevertheless, 
as the United States Supreme Court stated in the West-
ern Pacific· case: 
''No fixed formula exists for -applying the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the 
question is whether the reasons for the existence 
of the doctrine are present and whether the pur-
poses served will be aided by its application in 
the particular litigation.'' United States v. West-
ern Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64. 
Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce· Act was not 
completely emascul'ated by the Abilene case. In Pennsyl-
van~a R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co., 237 U.S. 121, 35 
Sup. Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867 (1915) a shipper brought 
suit in the Pennsylv,ania state court against the railroad 
for damages caused by the carrier's failure to furnish 
cars for the transportation of coal. The railroad moved 
to dismiss because the state court was without jurisdic-
tion. Both the tri~al court and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held th'at the state court did have jurisdiction, 
and affirmed judgn1ent against the carrier. The _United 
States Sup-reme Court affirmed. That court held that 
while Section 9 standing alone n1ight be construed as 
giving exclusive jurisdiction to either ·federal courts or 
agencies, this section was n1odified by Sec. 22, which 
12 
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pre-served all pre-existing common law and statutory 
remedies. In construing the Act as a whole, and citing 
the Ab~lene case, the court said: 
"It did not supersede the _jllrisdiction.~_o;t 
state courts~ __ in any .. case, n~W- or old, wh~.r.e~ .the 
d_e_cision , did.-llQ;,t....J.nyolye . the .det.e.rmina..tion _ of 
matters c~ling_Jor the exercis.~._Qf.Jh~. !.1dmiP,iB-
trative J2QWe_r_ ,ancl...discretion_Q.[ .. ihe __ ·Commission, 
9~r relate_ Jo _a_ subj~ci _a~ _ _to_ which. the iuris_dictiQn 
o£ the_ federal courts _h~d. . .o.therwise he_en_made._ 
exGh!§iv~." (.Jd., at 130, emphasis added) 
The court made the sound distinction .between an 
att1ack on .a rule o£ practice itself ( w:Qer~. the question of 
its fairness lay primarily wjthin. the_ judgment and -~di§­
cretion of the- CQmmission},.JlPJian attack on the 1n.anner. 
in. which the carrie;r 's rlJle is enforc~d, where ''there i~-· 
go~-=~d!fiini~tr~tiy~ __ g_!!est_iqg~j;q._vqly~d" id., at 131-32. The 
court pointed out that :vather than attack the rule, the 
plaintiff-shipper had "relied on the carrier's own rule 
as evidence" id., at 134, which of course is what appellant 
is doing in the instant case. Clearly, therefore, state 
courts still have jurisdiction of such cases. 
The landmark cases set forth the limits of the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction at the present time in the 
],ederal courts. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants 
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 66 L. Ed. 943, 42 Sup. Ct. 
4 77 ( 1922), the doctrine was not applied. This was a 
case commenced by the shipper against the carrier in 
a state court in Minnesota for an alleged overcharge. 
The issue was whether. the Railroad was entitled to 
13 
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make a charge for reconsignment of corn while en route. 
This turned on an interpretation of the tariffs which 
governed the contract of carriage. Mr. Justice Brandeis 
pointed out that in c.ases wh.,er_e a !a_te _wltich ~w~~s~alr~a,dy 
fixed and agreed. upon_-~§ being applicable,~w=~attM~ed 
as un.r~~_SQA!1R.le __ or __ ~!ljJlstly~ discriminatpry,. there mu~t 
b_e_J2r-.~limin~r~-~Q.rt to_.tP~. 0P.~t~t§!9n. 
"B~t , .. WP~~- eoi).~truetiQ~;t._~l!all be given to -~ 
railro~ ,tap.ff_ p~~~e~t~-~ ordinarily --~-~g!!~~-t!2.!L.Qi 
law which does not differ in character from those 
,_. - - - . _-_- -·· --~ --.... - . - . - .. - - . --=-· -- -- ~---··:.. 
PJ:"~S~nted W:tt~IJ.~ ,Jh~_:, ~~Op.§J!J!~ttQ~ ___ pf any other 
docul?~!l~~-i_~~~~!l dis put~." I d., at 291. 
The United States Supreme Court in that 0ase held 
that the issues were properly within the jurisdiction of 
the Minnesota state court. In that case Brandeis rather 
effectively does aw~ay with the uniformity argument 
stating: 
''The contention that courts are without juris-
diction of cases involving a disputed question of 
construction of an interstate tariff, unles.s there 
has been a preliminary resort to the Commission 
for its decision, rests, in the main, upon the 
following argument: The purpose of the Act to 
Regulate ~Commerce is to secure and preserve 
unifonnity. Hence, the carrier is required to file 
tariffs establishing uniform rates and charges, 
and is prohibited from exacting or accepting any 
payment not set forth in the tariff. Uniformity 
is impossible if the several courts, state~ Fed-
eral, are permitted, in case of disputed construc-
tion, to deter1nine what the rate or charge is 
which the tariff prescribes. To insure uniformity 
14 
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the true construction must, in case of dispute, be 
determined by the Commission. 
"This argument is unsound. It is true that 
uniformity is the paramount purpose of the Com-
merce Act. But it is not true that uniformity 
in construction of a t~ariff c.an be attained only 
through a preliminary resort to the Commission 
to settle the construction in dispute. Every ques-
tion of the construction of a tariff is deemed a 
question of law; and where the question concerns 
an interstate tariff, it is one of Federal Law. 
If the parties properly preserve their rights, .a 
construction given by any court, whether it be 
Federal or state, may ultimately be reviewed by 
this court, either on writ of error or on writ of 
certiorari; and thereby uniformity in construction 
may be secured. Hence, the attainment of uni-
formity does not require that in every case where 
the construction of a tariff is in dispute, there 
shall be a preliminary resort to the Commission.'' 
Id. at 290-91. 
In Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. American T~e & Timber 
Co., 234 U.S. 138, 58 L. Ed. 1255, 34 Sup. Ct. 885 (1914), 
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applied. There 
the shipper had a contract with the Union Pacific to 
furnish it railroad cross-ties, and it claimed that the 
Texas-Pacific Railroad wrongfully refused to haul them. 
There __ ~~-~--~o t!t.r.if~ _ specifica~ly_ ~9v~r.~11g --~ross7tie~S, but. 
there was a tariff for "lumber all kinds'' which the 
---- . -?-N·~~···"-·-c--•-~·· . ·--~-·~-' .,_._... ••··----------· ·' ---·--- ·-~•.-.· ... .- ' 
s~pp~:r ~l~a!!Q~i~l.JYJ1:.§~ ..... ~ ppl~.G-~l?J~LJ_o_<~jt..~ ____ er._Q§.§: ties. Th :g._~ 
the ~was a. djspute as __ tQ_ classification of _a __ particular 
WWle. There the shipper, prior to commencement of its 
action against the earner m the Federal court, had 
15 
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1nade complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Then as the Supreme Court s.aid: 
''By an amendment to the answer it was in-
sisted (by the Railroad) that under Section 9 of 
the Act to regulate commerce the plaintiff could 
not prosecute its action because, by making the 
complaint as it had done, to the Interstate Com-
. merce Commission, concerning the failure to treat 
the lumber tariff as embracing the rate on cross-
ties, the plaintiff had elected to proceed before 
the Commission." (I d., at 145, emphasis added). 
There was a conflict in the evidnece as to whether 
the "all lumber" tariff covered cross-ties. 
The motion to dismiss made by the Railroad was as 
follows: 
. "Because under the facts and circumstances 
now dvsclosed by the record, and compatible with 
the act of Congress of the United States to regu-
late interstate commerce, this court has no po"rer 
to consider and decide the subject matters which 
are complained of, or to a'vard the relief prayed 
for by plaintiff." (Id., at 141, emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court ordered that the case be dis-
Inissed. This decision was eight years prior to the Great 
Northern Ravlway decision, in 'Yhich the Supre1ne Court 
restricted the doctrine of prilnary jurisdiction by point-
ing out that questions of construction need not be re-
ferred, and in so doing the court distinguished the 
Ameri'can Tie case. 
One of the most recent pronouncements of the lTnited 
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States Supre1ne Court, upon which the Railroad here so 
heavily relies, is United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 
supra. In this case the Railroad sued the shipper (the 
United States Government) in the lTnited States Court 
of Claims for alleged undercharges. The questions raised 
inter alia were whether the articles in question fell within 
the tariff category of incendiary bombs, or whether they 
in fact had another classificati~~,l{t-~uld allow a lesser 
rate, and if the former category were held applicable, 
whether the resulting rate was unreasonable. It was thus 
a case involving a dispute as to classification. The 
shipper-defendant in that case requested that a referral 
be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The 
Court of Claims, relying on an earlier decision of its 
own, Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 
390, 111 F. Supp. 266 ( 1953), refused to do this and after 
interpreting the tariff, gave summary judg1nent to the 
Railroad, 132 Ct. CL 115, 131 F. Supp. 919 ( 1955). The 
Supreme Court in that case held that these matters 
should properly have been referred to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, but it stated: 
~ 
"By no means do we imply that matters of 
tarff construction are never cognizable in the 
courts. We adhere to the distinction laid down in 
Great Northern R. Co. vs. Merchants Elevator 
Co., supra, which call for a decision based on the 
particular facts of each case." United States v. 
Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 69. 
This then is the history of the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction as developed by the Federal Court system. 
While termed a valuable corollary in some senses, it has 
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) 
also been stated that "it is . . . becoming a shibboleth'. 
J·affe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. P .A. L. 
REV. 577 (1954). The doctrine's principal function to 
date has been to restrict jurisdiction previously granted 
by statute. The Railroad in the instant case seeks to use 
it as a means of creating jurisdiction when none exists 
by statute. The Railroad has cited no case in the court 
below and the app.ellant here has been unable to find any 
case where referral from a state court to a Federal ad-
ministrative agency was upheld over the objection of the 
defendant-shipper. The Railroad is thereby asking this 
court to ,sanction a procedure heretofore unauthorized 
by the very Federal court system which has erected this 
doctrine, and by so doing in effect to create the rigiit 
of a carrier, by the device of commencing this action in 
the forum of this state, to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, which it cannot other-
wise do. 
(b) Analysis of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction shows 
it does not arise in the instant case. 
To determine whether this doctrine arises in the 
instant case an analysis should be made of its basic 
nature. Abstractly, the very term "prin1ary jurisdiction" 
is comparative. From it one would assUI11e that there 
would be a "secondary jurisdiction'' (i.e., that there were 
two bodies which had jurisdiction, one of which was 
"primary" to another). Thus the very tern1 assumes the 
existence of concurrent initial jurisdiction. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Questions of primary jurisdiction arise only 
when the statutory arrangements are such that 
administrative and judicial jurisdiction are con-
current for the initial decision of some questions." 
(DA \7'IS, supra, 664, emphasis added.) 
The first question to be asked is obviously: is there 
here a concurrent jurisdiction between the Utah Court 
and the Interstate c·ommerce Commission~ Section 9 of 
the Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9) expressly authorizes ~~Y­
person claimin~to .h~ ... damaged by any carrier to alter-
II'J:Iolo~~~~,~.,.-~.v.,. ... __,_'t.\··· 1;-..:; 
natively make complaint to the Commission or to a 
district court of the United States. Thus in the 
ca~e of __ {he _lihipper __ suing .. a __ c~:cri~_r_ (the converse of 
our situation) the Interstate Commerce Commission does 
- .••. "'r.:'r~--~--..,......,· ,:;l'f"• ~ 
ha~._.00n.cnrr1mt juri§diction ,.~th '""'t~~'"'JI;g~t~~ _ S.tates 
.,.......,~ .. ..;:~;.,.:·-·· 
D~ttrt· by ~ft@-. exp.ress ~texro;;L~-.m~ .tlu~ __ statn_t~. In 
such a case the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would 
apply, in certain fact situations, to limit the shipper's 
alternative recourse to the courts. 
But the~~l!iLr9~4~ h~.~ ng~ right !()_~Q_:ffiJ:ll.eA~e il~_ ~ction 
b_~!Q_J;_~_ Jh~ .!l!terstate J~;ornm~rce Cqmmi~sio.n. The Act 
makes no ;erovi_si<?!! ___ fg:r __ "Jhi.:~- p"rocedure. __ No case.s. have 
'b~~I1 found even hplding that such procedu.re~ _would _be 
i_J!l:Qli~g by _t_~e. }\.gt._ 'rh11s quite obviously there js _no 
C<?_~cur,rent. jurisdiction and the doctrine does not come 
into pla r~ ~ -
If Congress had intended to give the Railroad the 
right to bring proceedings~gl~s\r its shippers before the 
Commission, it could have quite easily provided 
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for it, but since 1887 carriers have not been given this 
right and apparently have been content to bring their 
action for undercharges in either state or United States 
Federal courts. The policy reasons be~1ind sucll a dis-
tinction are sound. Shippers are not the group that the 
Interstate Commerce Act intended to regulate and exer-
, cise supervison over. They should not be haled before a 
Federal administrative body at the election of the regu-
lated industry merely because they happen to do bil.sine~s 
with this entity. Basic consideration of fairness urge 
that they should be allowed to defen~ such claims in the 
courts of their domicile where they are doing business. 
The fact is, therefore, that this is not a case \Yhere 
a Federal agency and a state court exercise joint juris-
djction, where the powers of the state court may be ex-
panded or contracted at the wish of Federal authority. 
~ehe sole initial jurisdiction in this case is \Yith the trial 
court. 
The rule.)s .well. esta!l~-...1!1~JCJ!Mi~<:>~Y~!~~9f~~ 
state court is pre-empted .. by . Federal ·legi$1~ t_ion pply 
when the enactll}ep.t in g,ue~tion ~~_pr~.§sly_ or by pllDl!_ca-
tion so states .. This rule has been characterized as. a mani-
festation of "due regard for the rightful independence 
of the states", Healy v. Ratta, 292 l.,_.S. 263, 5-± Sup. Ct. 
700, 78 L.Ed. 12-±S (1934), and as a reflection that Federal 
instrumentalities must ~~be ever n1indful of the dignity 
of the states", The llfaccabees v. C·ity of ]\Torth Chicago, 
125 F. 2d 330 (7th C~ir. 1942)~ ccrt. denied, 317 lT.S. 693, 
63 Sup. Ct. ~32, 87 L. Ed. 555 ( 1943). The rationale under-
lying the principle has, ho\vever, been best expressed 
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in a relatively recent opinion, Sq~tare D. Co. v. United 
J~lectri~cal, Radio & Mach. W'krs., 123 F. Supp. 776 (ED 
Mich, 1954), as a concern for '"preservation of our Fed-
eral system." In other words, the basis of the rule is a 
recognition tha.t our's is a Federal, not a unitary, form 
of government. 
(c) Even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did ari~s.e, 
it is not applicable in this case. 
This is not a case where it is alleged that a particular 
. "-" n t"'e~t$ t:J(' f( btf . h . . d 
rate 1s rmres6nr>re. t 1s not a case w ere 1t 1s allege 
that a particular article was not properly classified. It is 
not even a con1bination of these factors "where ... the 
questions of construction-Qlld reasonableness are so in-
tertwined that the same factors are determinative on 
both issues," which was the case in United States v. W e~t­
ern Pac. R. Co., supra at 68. It is not a matter in which 
the cost-allocation factors that have to go into rate 
making are an issue. With only a few exceptions the 
shipments in question in the instant actions retained the 
same classification both before and after fabrication and 
even in the exceptional cases the shipper does not urge 
here that the charge was improper or unreasonable. 
In this case the Railroad set forth certain rules 
governing fabrication of structual iron and steel in trans-
it, which, if they were followed, would make the through 
rate applicable. The only question before the court is: 
what do these rules mean~ What is their construction~ 
As the United States Supreme c·ourt made clear in 
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the Western Paci'fi-c case, matters of tariff construction 
are still cognizable by the courts without the need for 
referral. That court, in summing up its conclusion in 
that case, stated: 
"We say merely that where, .as here, the prob-
lem of cost allocation is relevant, and where there-
fore the questions of construction and reason-
ableness are so intertwined that the same factors 
are determinati·ve on both issues, that it vs the 
Commission which must first pass on them." 
(United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra at 
69, emphasis added). 
"Cost-allocation", of course, has to do v~ith rates-
the money to be charged which bears a reasonable rela-
tion to the class of product shipped which will earn a 
fuir return for the carrier. To determine 'vhat is a reason-
able rate, one must know about cost allocation, and this 
is unquestionably an esoteric field where expertise may 
well be the touchstone. 
But this case does not deal with these factors, The 
cost allocation factors that went into the computation of 
a through-rate and a short-haul rate for iron bars, for 
example, will remain completely unaffected by a court's 
determination of what the Railroad meant by ''fabrica-
tion". While in the A1neri·can Ti~e case the court may have 
felt it could not properly decide whether railroad cross 
ties were included in a "lu1nber, all kinds'~ classification 
without knowing what the cost-allocations "'ere that lead 
to the establislnnent of the rate for that classification, 
there is no such problen1 here. The rates have been fixed 
and are uncontested. 
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Certainly the fact that the words of a tariff defining 
a certain classification might include railroad cross ties 
(or castings filled with napalm jel) may only be half of 
the picture, if the cost-allocation factors which went 
into the establishment of the rate covering this classifi-
cation would make this conclusion an absurdity. The 
question there is, would the resulting rate, considering 
the cost factors involved in the transportation of the ar-
ticle, result in a fair and reasonable return to the Rail-
road~ ~ut~whetl).er .. J~tl.! interii1edi~t~,=-i~bri~~·t.ox_ bendsjts 
~te~!__ b~rs, me, rely_ stores thenl~!lr _Jies_ __ them in knots, 
does_ ~ot affec_t o~~- particle tb:e .oost-allocatio:n which 
goes into making up the rate _fur= this classification 
-- ~-~ .. -~;:;.~-....:J.... .-- ,_ .. 
(asslliill,ng that the fabrication <ig~~ not_ change _ th~-~l~s_s 
of the :Qroductl_. These steps have nothing to do with 
CJlSt .to~ the -c~ailroad, but only._,.cost_J_(),, t4e shipper. 
The United States Supreme Court has always recog-
nized that disputed questions of construction, being one 
of the very basic things which courts were established 
to handle, remain untainted by its self-imposed doctrine 
of limited jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine a purer 
case of disputed construction than the one before this 
court. Obscure and complex these rules may be. But, of 
course, it is usually the obscure and complex contract 
ihat leads to litigation. Surely the difficulty inherent 
for the Railroad in ·pursuading the court to accept its 
interpretation of its own obscure and complex wording 
is not an argument for persuading this court that it is 
incapable of interpreting it. The United States Supreme 
Court said in the Western Pacific case, at 66-67, "There 
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the Court held that where the question is simply one of 
construction the courts may pass on it as an issue 'solely 
of law'". There is quite a difference between a question 
which is "simply one of construction" and "one of simple 
construction". To argue that a court can retain juris-
diction only of the !~is an affront to the court's 
basic capacity. 
The Western Pacvfic case is not determinative, or 
even helpful to us in this particular case for two other 
reasons. First, it says nothing as to the correct procedure 
to be followed where a defendant shipper opposes the 
reference, rather than requests it.* Certainly this is a 
critical distinction where the plaintiff could not have 
brought it before the Connnission of its OW'll volition. 
Second, it was a case where both the trial court and the 
administrative agency were part of the same Federal 
political system. It does not help us in defining the re-
lationship between state courts and Federal aillninistra-
tive bodies. 
POINT IV. 
THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE COURTS OF 
THIS STATE WISH TO ABDICATE VOLUNTARILY SOME 
OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND WHETHER THEY CAN 
DO THIS. 
It has been noted that state courts have been most 
reluctant in the absence of definitive legislatiYe enact-
-K· This possibility does not even occur to most of the writers 
in the field. Thus one writer uses as subheadings to his article, 
"Plaintiffs' Efforts to Avoid the Doctrine'' and "Defendants' 
Efforts to Invoke the Doctrine." von Mehren, supra at 941 & 947. 
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ment, to abdicate their jurisdiction (and in consequence, 
their judicial power and responsibility) to administrative 
bodies. This observation is equally true whether argu-
ment has been made that the jurisdiction of the executive 
agency is "exclusive", that there has been no "exhaustion 
of administrative remedy" or that executive jurisdiction, 
while "concurrent", is "primary". The policy which 
buttresses this approach is well stated in Papetti . v . 
.__.. . . ~ 
Al~candro, al1 Mass. 382, .. at 386, 58 N. E. 2d 155,at 157 
-(1944) : "The burden is strongly on him who asserts that 
the fundamental right of all persons of access to the 
court has been taken away by legislation." 
There are, of course, numerous state cases in which 
the defendant has resisted successfully the assertion of 
initial jurisdiction by the courts. These have been decided 
on the basis of explicit constitutional or legislative man-
dates. The converse, however, is equally true: the courts 
of the several states have not relinquished gratuitously 
their judicial perogatives to their administrative cousins. 
J;f a v:.~lig~~!Yiitt~P.1~1YJ~-~-~-- - !lQ(§.9. _p:rqy·>ide.d, the QQnrts have 
r.~tained the totality of their . j11risdiction (their power) 
'-;~-~i'th~i~~-·~~;p,onsibility. 1J!fai~---Realty Co. v. Blackstone 
Valley Gas & Electric Co., 59 R.I. 29, 193 A. 879 (1937} 
is typical~ The realty company owned a multi-unit rental 
building. It, as well as each of its tenants, used electricity. 
Application was made to the electric company for the 
installation of a single meter for the building; the land-
lord company proposed to re-sell electricity to its tenants. 
The electric company refused, although it provided such 
service to other landlord users. Even after the electric 
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company was successful in obtaining, from the State 
Division of Public Utilities, a ruling prohibiting such an 
arrangement, the electric company continued to sell for 
resale to preferred customers. The realty co:rppany then 
brought action to recover damages for the unreasonable 
discrimination to which it had been subjected. The de-
fendant sought the shelter of an administrative deter-
mination; it argued that the jurisdiction of the State 
Division of Public Utilities was concurrent with that of 
the court and that the administrative jurisdiction was 
primary to that of the judiciary. The court rejected this 
contention. It noted that the Division could not entertain 
an action for, and could not award, damages. There was 
no "election provision" in the applicable statutes. There 
was, hence, no basis of concurrent jurisdiction necessary 
to the invocation of the doctrine of "primary jurisdic-
tion". The jurisdiction of the judiciary was, in short, 
exclusive. Another case illustrative of the proposition is 
llouston Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Com-
mission 19 S. W. 2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd 124 
Tex. 375, 78 S. W. 2d 591 (1935). Against the contention 
of the defendants that the plaintiffs, shippers, must ap-
ply, as a condition precedent to a judicial challenge of 
the validity of a rate, to the commission to undo or mod-
jfy its action (an argument 'vhich "~as, technically, one 
of "exhaustion of adn1inistrative remedy'', rather than 
of "primary jurisdiction"), the court held at 588. 
"In rate making, the functions of the com-
mission are legislative in character and its orders 
prospective in operation ... Insofar as its orders 
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already made are concerned, the courts alone 
can give relief." 
Waukesha Gas & E. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., 175 
Wis. 420, 184 N. W. 702 (1921) considers a demurrer, up-
held by the trial court, founded upon the suggestion that 
a regulatory body, the Railroad Commission, had ·"ex-
clusive jurisdiction". The motor company had counter-
claimed, alleging a breach of the electric company's con-
tract to supply gas to it. The court reversed. It held that 
such exclusive jurisdiction is dependent upon statute and 
that, where no statute confers such jurisdiction, it does 
not exist. 
In the event that the written law of a state has ex-
plicitly bestowed quasi-judicial jurisdiction concurrent 
with that of the courts, upon an administrative agency, 
there has been adherence to the principle of separation 
of powers. In some instances, this adherence has led tQ 
the outright r~i~:Gtio~, .. ~~~th~ ~tate .. plane, ~fjh~~chanics ____ _ 
of "primary jurisdiction". A group of California de-
-·+- - -~-~-- "-"1.a 
cisions exemplifies the approach, Truck Owners, Inc., v. 
Supervor Court, 194 Cal. 146, 228 P. 19 (1924) ; Vallejo 
Bus Co. v. Superior Co~~rt, 19 Cal. App. 201, 65 P. 2d 86 
(1937); Mvller v. R~ai.Zroad Commission, 9 Cal. 2d 190, 70 
P. 2d 164 (1937). T_!lese cases construe the applicable law 
to be that, in a controversy regarding a question of fact, 
the Railroad Com:mlssion's jurisdiction Js not only con-
-+_ .. ~ - ·--··~ -- - dl:: 
rurrent with tha.L of the courts, but, when invoked, pri-
nlar:~ The cases do not, however, demonstrate a willing-
ness on the part of the judiciary to divest itself of its 
responsibility. To the contrary, they hold that, until the 
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primary executive jurisdiction is actually exercised, the 
courts will adjudicate all questions, including those of 
fact. 
The cardinal bulwark of state court rejection of the 
philosophy that admittedly quasi-judicial regulatory bod-
ies should become more and more "judicial" and less and 
less "quasi" has been their steadfast refusal to abandon 
the principles enunciated in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. 
Merchants Elevator Co., supra, and r~iterated in Un~ted 
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra. State courts, mind-
ful of the importance of the separation of powers, have, 
as have Federal courts, held questions of law, as opposed 
to questions of fact, to be within their exclusive.._not con-
current, not primary, but exclusive - jurisdiction. In 
llfain Realty Co. v. Blackstone Gas & Electric Co., supra, 
for instance, the court considered the probable character 
of its ruling had the Rhode Island statute provided for 
administrative primary jurisdiction. It opined that this 
circumstance would not alter its decision. It cited Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 457, 53 Sup. 
Ct. 441, 77 L. Ed. 888 ( 1933) : 
"But if the rule, regulation, or practice of the 
carrier is not attacked and the shipper's claim is 
grounded upon its violation or discrn11inatory en-
forcenlent, there is no ad1ninistrativ-e question in-
volved. In such cases the court is required 1nerely 
to decide whether the carrier has departed fron1 its 
established standard. The decision does not con-
cern the reasonableness or v-aliditY of the rule it-
·self and it has no tendency against uniformity or 
other purpose of the _.~.-\ct. Suits for da1nages upon 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such grounds may be prosecuted without action 
or finding by the commissioner." 
In Gardner v. Ri,ch Mfg. Co., 68 Cal. App. 725, 158 
P. 2d 23 (1945) the defendant .shipper contended that 
< 
the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the 
action of :e!_aintiff carriers for additional freight charges. 
It was argued that the plaintiff must exhaust its admini-
strative remedies before the Railroad Commission. The 
court, in rejecting the contention, held at 730-731, 158 P. 
2d at 25-26: 
"In making this argument defendants mis-
conceives the nature of these actions. They are 
simply actions to recover a stated amount of 
money-the difference betvveen the amount paid 
under the contract between the carriers and the 
shipper and that under the rates fixed by the 
railroad commission in the aforesaid decisions 
and orders. The court ·was called upon to decide 
what rate the railroad commission had established 
for a particular commodity transported by motor 
vehicle in specified quantities. It was then simply 
a question of the application of these rates to the 
facts as disclosed by the evidence. No question of 
fixing.}:~J~§ 9l:. rules 9.r r~gulations is in any way 
involved. That had already been determined by the. 
railroad commission in its decisions and orders. 
There is, therefore, no reason why the superior 
court should not have jurisdiction of these cases 
for the effect of the judgments, if properly ren-
dered, is to enforce the rates already established 
by the Railroad Commission." 
Chicago Ci~ty Ry. Co. v. Chicago and W.I.R.R. Co ... 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
331 Ill. 151, 162 N. E. 852 (1928) involved an action for 
damages incident to plaintiff's shifti~g of material and 
equipment consequential to defendant's repair of a via-
duct. Defendant challenged jurisdiction. The court, at 
158, 162 N. E. at 854, spoke as follows: 
"The question involved is the duty of the par-
ties to the contract under the admitted facts and 
the ordinances by which they operate in the city 
of Chicago. This question is purely one of law. 
Jurisd~ction is authority to hear and decide a 
cause." 
The Court of Ap.peals of the State of New York has 
taken the same view, Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Unvon Gas. 
Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N. E. 2d 287 (1938). The action was 
one to restrain defendant company from collection of a 
"reconnection charge'' on the ground that "service 
charges" were legislatively prohibited. Defendant ques-
tioned jurisdiction. Citing Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puri,tan 
Coal Min. Co., supra, it was decided that, inasmuch as 
the issue was one of law, direct application to the judici-
ary for relief was available. In Brentwood-McMechan 
Water Co. v. Wheeling, 121 W. Va. 373, 4 S. E. 2d 300 
(1939), a case involving respective rights under a con-
tract between two water companies, it "~as stated at 378, 
4 S. E. 2d at 303 : 
"The public service co1nmission, under the 
broad powers given it by the legislature, has the 
right to pass upon the question of whether or not 
a public utility may enter into a given contract, 
because of the effect sueh contract may have upon 
the power of the utility to carry out its purposes; 
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but when a contract is once entered into, its con-
struction and interpretation and the rights grow-
ing out of the same, including the right to termi-
nate, are to be determined by the court.'' 
Transportation Co. v. Publc Service Comm~ssion, 125 
W.Va. 71, 23 S. E. 2d 53 (1942) reaffirmed emphatically 
the Brentwo-od-M eM echan rule: it held nugatory the 
commission's consent to the termination of a public util-
ity contract. A final example of state court assertion of 
judicial prerogative, and the concommitant refusal to 
abdicate it to the executive branch, is M adregano v. W vs-
consin Gas & Electrvc Co., 181 Wis. 611, 195 N. W. 861 
(1923). Plaintiff initiated an action to force defendant to 
furnish electric service. Defendant sought to remove the 
cause from original judicial scrutiny and into the hands 
of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission. The court, at 618) 
195 N. W. at 264, reacted in the following fashion: 
'fiLe reaso..na.bleness _of a rule established by a..JL1lb1i~_Jltility __ fQX~Jhe. conduct and management 
of its business should . be _first determined in .Jl 
p_roceding before the Railroad __ Comrnission .. While 
this is true, when rules are once estab~ished,. the 
parties may ·prop-erly-.appeal to. the Court to yi~­
dicate their rights in r~spect the.re'fo: It should iiof 
befoi:gotten ffiat the ~~judicial power is under our 
Cons1itution vested in the courfSand tlia1 it cannot 
by Act of the LegisJ.itpr~-Ji~ witlJgr_~w~ .fr9.m the 
courls and confer.r~d upon an administrative. body. 
Wilen -~eas,~nable. rates aiid "rules· or·· regula1ions 
have been established, the enforcement of rights 
of parties in relation thereto presents matters 
which are properly a subject for judicial inquiry." 
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Whenever, in these matters, administrative agencies 
have been found to lack jurisdiction, the courts have not 
thought of relinguishing that portion of their power 
'vhich one of the litigants would prefer to have reside with 
the executive branch. The reason is apparent. Power, if 
it is not to constitute tyranny, must be joined with re-
sponsibility. If a regulatory body is not bestowed with 
an iota of such responsibilty in a given matter, it should 
not be granted power, for its determinations will quite 
likely be a hindrance to the court, to the responsible body. 
In this connection, the language of Waukesha Gas & E. 
Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., supra, at 426-27, 184 N. W. 
at 704, is helpful: 
"In this case the findings of the Railroad 
Commission can be of no assistance to the court. 
The obligations of tiLe utility are meas_ured _by 
terms of its contract with the defendant. If that 
-~----·--'- ----~ --·-·-~..,~-'~ •• ..,-...----~· --.......... ~~~~-~_,..-~~ .~=-:-: -- - -- - '·-.. ·.-
is a _Y.alid_ contract, and \Ve no\v ,m-.e-so~as.sJrm.ing, 
the only issl]._e to p~ qeter:rl)ined is whether there 
wa,§_ __ ~!_ breach the~eof --~n--tlte part- ~f tlu~ ~itlliti 
and_~pe ~9P.P.t.()f t.h~ damage~,s-qJ~>t~j~~g_ ___ b~call~-~ 
of such breach. This is a judicial question, pure 
and simple. It is a wrong sustained by the de-
fendant which the Railroad Conmrission has no 
power to redress, neither can it be of any assist-
ance to the court in deterinining the rights of the 
parties." 
This very court has previously ruled on questions of 
tariff construction without invoking the doctrine of re-
ferral. Western Pac. R. Co. v. Wasatch Chemical Oo., 
117 Utah 41,.1_217 P. 2d 371 (1950). Evidently it felt 
attliaF-tiine that the doctrine of prhnary jurisdiction -\vas 
unnecessary in the State of Utah. 
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In light of these e.La~~~i1i~6, serious question can be 
raised as to the desirability of referral. While the Fed-
eral courts have created their own body of common law 
on this matter, this court is perfectly free, within Utah's 
court system, to disregard it if it feels it either to be 
undesirable or jurisdictionally impossible. The criticism 
leveled at the Federal court doctrine by several learned 
authors previously referred to shows the many problems 
that the policy can create. (Jaffe, Convisser, supra.) 
But, the particular problems before this court in 
this case raise the even more fundamental question-
whether the trial court has the power to make such a 
referral. 
The Railroad has asked that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission answer five different questions deal-
ing with the construction and interpretation of Tariff 
7188-P. For example, the Railroad asks: 
"Under the provisions· of UPRR Tariff 7188-
P, effective May 15, 1952, and applicable supple-
ments thereto: Is a transit operator entitled to the 
balance of through-rate on outbound straight car-
load shipments of products listed in Item 5 of 
said tariff if said products have merely been 
stored at the transit station and have not been 
fabricated or reworked at the transit station~" 
(r.p. 38) 
This is clearly the referral of a question of law. (The 
order of referral of the trial court also orders determi-
nation of questions of fact, although this was not even 
·requested in the Railroad's petition.) Aside from the 
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point that this is the very -type of construction question 
that the United States Supreme Court in the Great 
Northern case has held should not be referred, it is urged 
that a Utah court cannot refer such a question to the 
Interstate Connnerce Commission. 
A trial court has a duty to determine the contro-
versy presented to it. As the United States Supreme 
Court has said : 
"It (the trial court) cannot, of its own motion, 
or upon the request of one party, abdicate its duty 
to determine by its own judgment the contro-
versy pres~t; and to devolve that duty upon 
any of its~ J-c...t~." J(imberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 
512, 524, 32 L. Ed. 764 (1889) 
The Utah Constitution provides that: 
"The Judicial power of the State shall be 
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of impeach-
ment, in a Supreme Court, in district courts, in 
justices of the peace, and such other courts infer-
ior to the Supreme Court as may be established 
by law." (Art. VIII, Sec. 1) 
The Constitution further provides that: 
"The district court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters civil and crnninal, not ex-
cepted in this c·onstitution, and not prohibited by 
law." (Art. \-'III, Sec. 7.) 
The Constitution in dealing 'Yith a judge. pro tempore, 
provides that any cause in the district court n1ay be tried 
before such a judge only 'vhen agreed upon by the par-
ties or their attorneys of record. (Art. \-.III, Sec. 5.) 
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There is no provision for relegation of questions of law 
to a non-judicial body of this state. 
Nor do the Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by this 
court justify referral of these questions. 
As Moore, the great authority on the Federal Rules 
of Civ# Procedure, states, ''But the court cannot, with-
out the consent of the parties, refer the whole case to 
the master for final decision." 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 2950 (1951). 
This principle is borne out by Rule 43 (.a) UR~CP 
which requires that all testimony of the witnesses should 
be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided 
for by the rules. Rule 53 deals with the question of 
referrals to a master. Rule 53 (b) states that, ''A refer-
ence to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.'' 
The reasons for the extreme reluctance to delegate 
such powers are well set forth in an opinion of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: 
''Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, 
in every suit, save where exceptional circum-
stances are shown. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that references gre.atly increase the 
cost of litigation and delay and postpone the end 
of litigation. References are expensive and time-
consuming. The delay in some instances is un-
believably long. Likewise, the increase in cost is 
heavy. For nearly a century, litigants and mem-
bers of the bar have been crying against this 
avoidable burden of costs and this inexcusable 
delay. Likewise; the litigants prefer, and are en-
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titled to, the decision of the Judge of the court 
before whom the suit is brought. Greater confi-
dence in the outcome of the contest and more 
respect for the judgment of the court arises when 
the trial is by the Judge.'' Adventures iJn Good 
Eatilng v. Best Places to E~at, 131 F. 2d 809 (7th 
Cir. 1942') . 
In the case of a jury trial (and defendants are here 
entitled to a jury trial) ~a "reference shall be made only 
when the issues are complicated.'' Rule 53 (b) URCP. 
Tlie only effect of the findings of the mastei on the 
-issues presented to hi~ is that they are admissible as 
-.) ....... __ ., _ _._, •.. .......,r'i?GK"~:A& - --
evidence on the matters found, and may be read to the 
..,....~~.........._,. •• ~~""i'F - , •• ·- -- • - - • --
jury. Rule 53(e) (3) URCP. 
Even in cases of a non-jury trial the rule provides 
that "Reference shall, in the absence of ':~ritten consent 
of the part~§ __ be_ made -~2!!1I U"QQn a_ sP-om11g" that some 
excepti~ C9_!lgitioiLI:eq.uixes i+ '? RpJQ __ 53-(.b~ IIRQP. T}?.e 
-~-
'record is barren of any showing at all by the Railroad 
of exceptional conditions requiring such a referral. 
Rule 53(£) gives a party the right to object to the 
appointment of any person as a master. 
All of these argun1ents militate against referring 
these questions to any 1naster. Defendant is entitled to 
have its c,ause heard before a jury if it so chooses. To 
refer these questions to a 1naster is only to add an addi-
tional burden to the litigants, because at 1nost the 
1naster's findings, prepared after a tedious administni-
tive,process, will not be deter1ninative. 
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It is obvious that the Railroad feels that a Utah trial 
court would be in sufficient awe of any recommendations 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission that it would 
merely act as a rubber st~amp to the opinions of the 
experts. 
But it is singular indeed that a Utah court, even 
~_,,._.,_-.o.:.·-.• .• f----·"'····;;:; .. ~··:··--·T·. . ::::_.,..,f""t:~~~~~~~~~ -~ 
if it felt the issues were proper for ____ r.e_ferenceJ, w.oJild. 
refe_r'""i~t~pl~~ an adm~nistratime body completely outs_iqe 
t~~~Jl~.~-o-~j!~ 1udicw1· .. ·system,··-,~~-~~t!!g~~~-----~-~ .. ,.tr~,~~~E~,: 
~en~!t!X _j:)_i, the ~~£~1~~g£!~E?!!!~,~~:- ~~h~--c reference, 
when not compell~~ by 1aw,- is not only .Y!<?!~i~-- of Jh~ 
principle 'o:f sepa~atio~· -~~~~£~-~ers but also of the prin-
0 -CTPie, eqll~iiY~i~po;t;;t. t~··~A~~ri~"M·-gove;iurt~;t~~2i 
1e<Ieral1sni .. rrrs=~~~~O·<~~~e ®~~.o~;;kable that .it ·f~lt, as 
...:..,.-:~:"';'.".;:.;.':.·,..,_:•.-·"·····-"".:;._~-o..~,;;-,..;_., 
it did in the instant case, that it could order that the 
. ...., r-~~~~ 
Interst,ate Commerce __ Commission make a reJ?ort and 
-=--~---:------:"=··-,~~~-~-~., .. ,~-=~-~r-=• -_· - • ··-~~-
deter;mination (r.p. 43). 
"-,- ~~~~~ 
It is axiomatic that a master to whom a matter is 
referred by the trial court must be a person responsiJble 
to and accountable to the court. 
''A master in chancery is an assistant of the 
chancellor, and his function is the performance 
of Acts, either judicial or ministerial in nature 
which the chancellor may see fit, in accordance 
with equity practice, to require of him. He acts 
as the representative of the chancery court, and 
his official conduct is subject to the court's con-
trol and supervision.'' 19 AM. JUR., Equ~ty, '§ 
365 (cf. 45 AM. JUR., References, § 17) 
It is impossible to read Rule 53, URCP, which 
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pertains to the equivalent of the master in chancery, in 
any other light. It is, in fact, most difficult to imagine 
an .administration of justice which would even ·smack 
of efficiency and good order if a master's status were 
in law coordivnate im power with or· superior iln power 
to that of the trial judge. Such a ''master" could, with 
impunity, transcend the limitations of the order of refer-
ence; he could, by caprice, refuse to carry out all of or 
a part of his mandate. Perhaps more important, he could 
not be disciplined or removed for prejudice, bias, mis-
conduct or an expression of an opinion prior to the 
hearing. Such a "master", in short, would be irrespon-
sible. In this light, he would not be, and could not be, 
as a matter of law, a master. Any. attempt by any court 
to so designate him would be tneffectual. A court ca'YIInot 
abdicate its dutiJes to a "master" not responsible to and 
accowntable to ~t. 
~in~~~!lt ord~r, __ ii~.,..!J.:=i_§= ~2!!~!~~~~ a mere 
reference, i~~~~p.pie~t.loc~!h.~ __ f~.!:~g:Q_~ng_ objection· and, 
"""-"- . . ~~'t--!'::•-~"-- .. ...., . ... At... 
hence~ Iii< invalid. By s11ch_ ~911_~tlJ1S.tiQp., the_ Federal Inter-
- ' ~~'- :_--,~ .·- ~...-"}....>\:' 
@~:~~:!i~~:~~~~!:r:::~:.il1;~~~~tl:~~~i:i;~ 
-~ one hand, t:vanscend the limitations of the reference or, / 2) O!! the .o.ther, leave unfulfilled the reference's m~.~tef 
~;f'· C.an the ti:ial court .m~<i1':eE~~ Jlie" membflX!!...cl ( .: ... the c·olnn!i§si9n, individually or as a body, if they demo~­
stra:t~· prejudice o~---bia.'s:~ 1niseonduet then1selYes o~--~~~-
---...-' "' . '• -_,....,.N>' - .. 
press an_ op_inion_qn the interpretation of the tariff prior 
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senes of interrogatories is in the negative. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission is a Federal instrumen-
tality. It 'is an agent of the Federal government, not of 
any of the states. _!!.s procedure conforms to Federal,... 
not state, directives. Its members, a.s to theiL qfficial 
_.,.,...,.....- -~ 
ac.tions, are cloaked with immunit_Y ... ~rom_ st~d~r~~tirul_ 
-- • -~-·}'>o··.~·::-..=--r.·r..!!"~'r -· -
or djscipJjpe,,In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, 
_.p 
34 L. Ed~ 55 (1890). Under these circumstances, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission cannot, as a matter of law, 
be the trial court's master. 
The answer to this absurdity is obvious. If the Rail-
road feels that the trial court is incapable of analyzing 
the terms of a contract which the Railroad evidently 
felt when it was filed were perfectly understandable 
to any shipper vvho wished to avail himself of it, and the 
Interstate ·Commerce Commission feels the matter of suf-
ficie!lt importance, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
-can petition the court to appear as an amicus curiae. 
T_he court could then have the advantage of ''expertise'' 
as to questions of 1aw. As to questions of fact, these 
matters would have to be presented before the court, 
or jury, in any event. If the Railroad feels that employees 
of the Commission are helpful to it on that score, there 
·is no reason for a two-time appearance of these gentle-
In en, once before the master and once before the court. 
The ultimate trier of the fact should be able to see and 
observe these worthies at first hand. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Railroad seeks, by bringing its action in the 
courts of this state, to gain access to a Federal adminis-
trative body not otherwise available to it. It thus seeks 
to extend the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction", a 
creature of common law of the Federal judiciary, so 
that it serves to create jurisdiction, instead of its histor-
ical role as a restriction on jurisdiction. The instant 
case comes within the well-defined exception to the doc-
trine of p·rimary jurisdiction. The doctrine, however, 
does not even apply where the administrative agency in 
question does not have initial concurrent jurisdiction, 
which the Interstate Commerce Commission does not 
have here. The sole question remaining, therefore, is 
whether the state court should, and whether it can, abdi-
cate some of its functions to such an .agency. The policy 
against such abdieation is great, and in any event, the 
court has no power to so refer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, ·CLENDENIN, 
l\IOFF AT & :JIABEY 
b~~ ALBERT J. CoLTON 
CAL,TIN L. RAl\IPTON 
Attorneys for .£_1ppellant 
Structural Steel & Forge Co. 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~fiq1 
li?csr· drz ,4, V 14~ . 
&s-()ttJA!t§(r:_~A ~ s;5 -;G~ ;z-;~ ~ 





Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
